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DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
ABSTRACT
What demographic backgrounds are associated with a person’s attitudes toward
immigrants and immigration policies? Applying group threat theory and contact theory, I
propose that race, age, education, political views, and religiosity all affect how people view
immigration. To test the hypotheses, I analyze data from the 2014 General Social Survey, in
which adults living in households in the United States are randomly selected and interviewed. A
subset containing 1,022 respondents who answered every question relevant to this study is
selected from the 2014 GSS. The univariate analysis shows that most Americans do not agree
with the statement that immigrants undermine American culture, and that Americans are divided
on whether the number of immigrants should be increased nowadays. The multivariate result
indicates that education and political views are the most significant predictors of how one views
immigrants and immigration policies, correspondingly, while race, age, and religiosity have no
statistically significant relationships with either dependent variable. Statistical findings support
the hypothesis that the more liberal a person is, the more likely the person is to agree that
immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants
nowadays should be increased. Contact theory is consistent with the result of this study.
However, the findings also demonstrate that immigration is a complicated issue. This study is
valuable in understanding the acceptance of immigrants across demographic groups. It also
invites additional research on this important topic that will affect the future of the United States.
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As a country of immigrants, the United States has a longstanding history of having one of
the largest numbers of foreign-born citizens in the world (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2012).
Historically, increased immigration has been strongly correlated with the growth of the economy
and social development(Fussell 2014). However, Americans’ stances on immigrants and
immigration policies have not always been positive (Fussell 2014; Berg 2014; Berg 2015).
Notably, in recent years, there has been growing anti-immigrant sentiments along with the social
and political change in this nation (Flores 2018).
Scholars of many disciplines have been studying the intricate relationship between the
benefits of immigration to the nation and anti-immigration views (Bikmen 2015; Chandler and
Tsai 2001; Czaika 2015; Esses, Brochu, and Dickson 2012; Esses 2002). Sociologists,
specifically, have been theorizing such correlation (Berg 2015; Fussell 2014). Of the sociological
theories proposed for the attitudes towards immigration, group threat theory is cited frequently to
describe the issue at hand. Group threat theory describes the perceived fear of the presence and
size of the out-group among in-group members (Berg 2014; Blumer 1958; Brown 2013). On the
immigration issue in the United States, the in-group usually includes native-born Americans,
while the out-group covers foreigners as well as naturalized citizens residing in the United
States. Based on the group threat theory, native-born Americans may feel that the size of
immigrants threatens job and welfare prospective for the natives (Czaika 2015). Especially, for
many White Americans, the vast number of immigrants from Hispanic and Asian nations may
soon change the racial makeup of the nation, as there will likely be less than half of Americans
who identify as White in the next decade or so (Berg 2014; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav
2015). The “threat” of immigration is perceived differently across demographic groups in the
United States (Cabaniss and Cameron 2018; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Nagel and Ehrkamp
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2017; Chandler and Tsai 2001). Moreover, there are approximately 50 million legal and
unauthorized immigrants, which is around a sixth of the entire country’s population (Hoefer,
Rytina, and Baker 2012). Therefore, it is vital and reasonable to examine how various
demographic identities correlate the stances on immigration.
In this research, I propose that demographic classifications such as race, age, education,
political leanings, and religiosity have impacts on the in-group individuals’ attitudes towards
immigrants. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
1. Compared to White people, people of color are more likely to agree that immigrants do
not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants nowadays
should be increased.
2. The older a person is, the less likely the person is to agree that immigrants do not
undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants nowadays should
be increased.
3. The more years of education one completes, the more likely the person is to agree that
immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants
nowadays should be increased.
4. The more liberal a person is, the more likely he or she agrees that immigrants do not
undermine American culture and says that the number of immigrants nowadays should be
increased
5. The more frequently one attends religious services, the less likely the person is to agree
that immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of
immigrants nowadays should be increased.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
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Group Threat Theory
Proposed by Blumer (1958:3), group threat theory describes how race prejudice
originates from group positions rather than individual feelings. Before Blumer, social scientists
mainly thought that racial bias is expressed in the form of individual feeling. However, Blumer
(1958:3) shows that the precedent views lack the understanding of racial relations in terms of
racial groups. Race, in the United States, is institutionalized. It means that individuals who are
racially prejudiced discriminate on the basis of the social identification of self and others.
Therefore, as Blumer (1958:7) claims, it is inadequate to evaluate individual feelings alone to
grasp prejudice. Instead, group positioning is crucial to the comprehension of the prerogative
feelings of the “others.” Threat, the feeling that the inferior group may jeopardize the superior
group’s social position, is then established on the ground of collective negative feelings.
Going beyond race, the study by Ben-Nun Bloom’s team examines two areas of threats
native-born people feel about incoming migrants (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015). The first is
cultural threat. Cultural threat describes the fear of losing cultural capitals such as ethnic history,
norms, values and symbolic establishments to diversity due to immigration (Ben-Nun Bloom et
al. 2015:1762). Cultural threat makes in-group members cohere closely to their group values, and
a critical part of such group values is often the negative attitudes toward immigrants, since
immigrants threaten symbolic social and political power of the natives. In the Western countries,
immigrants of color face the most scrutiny while integrating into the communities they are
moving into, as race is a distinct indicator of a social and cultural identity. The second form of
threat is material threat (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015:1762). The sense of material threat comes
from the identification of the loss of resources such as jobs, welfares, and housing because of
newcomers. The negative feelings toward immigrants increase when a native-born person sees
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that there are out-group members holding jobs that were used to be held by in-group members, or
when a native finds out that the price of owning a house rises as there is a lack of supply of
available housing more so than ever. Cultural and material threats may be targeted at different
groups of people. For instance, natives who feel culturally threatened dislike immigrants that are
vastly different from them. On the other hand, individuals who are materially threatened may
only support unintegrated immigrants because unintegrated immigrants will have a harder time
taking jobs from the natives. Ben-Nun Bloom et al. (2015:1763) argue that while the two forms
of threat appeal to different psychological motivations, they complement each other in
constructing the opposition to immigration. By taking race and religion into account, the study
shows that many immigrants are presented as threatening in both ways (Ben-Nun Bloom et al.
2015). Moreover, since each of the two types of threat can also trigger the rationalization of
xenophobia, the overall hostile attitudes toward immigrants will likely to increase when either
cultural or material threat exists among the in-group members.
Contact Theory
Contact theory, often referred to as contact hypothesis, helps explain the reasons behind a
person’s pro- or anti-immigration sentiments in a different way. Initially proposed by Allport
(1954), contact theory states that the lack of interpersonal and intergroup contact may be closely
related to widespread prejudices and stereotyping on minorities. Contrary to the group threat
theory that conceptualizes xenophobia as the result of conflict and fear, contact theory considers
prejudice as the result of a form of socialization that fails to expose the individual to the diverse
society he or she lives in (Allport 1954; Fussell 2014). Contact theory also proposes that with
future positive encounters, individuals’ belief system and attitudes towards a diverse population
can be reshaped. In this study, contact theory can also explain how race, age, education, political
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leaning, and religiosity may affect one’s position on immigration. Education level, for instance,
positively correlates one’s contact with out-group members, as the school is a place to gather
people of varied background and personal values. Specifically, colleges provide a platform for
students to learn in a community that is often different in demographic composition from where
students are from. In compliance with the contact theory, the hypothesis that people with more
years of education hold more positive attitudes toward immigration is logical. Similarly, people
of particular racial background, age, political affiliation, and religion also have more contacts
with their corresponding out-groups than others. Consequently, the contact theory provides
valuable insights and sociological background for this study, especially on the causes and effects
of prejudices.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Sociological literature on the issue of immigration has focused extensively on
immigrants’ assimilation and social inequalities that exist in the current immigration system
(Cabaniss and Cameron 2018; Berg 2014; Bohman and Hjerm 2014). Studies emphasizing the
relationship between demographic factors and immigration attitudes primarily concentrate on
one specific social identity, such as race, political affiliation, or religion (Browne, Reingold, and
Kronberg 2018; Knoll 2009; Bohman and Hjerm 2016; Flores 2018; Hawley 2011). While there
is currently a lack of comprehensive analyses of various demographic aspects on the attitudes
toward immigrants, previous literature provides invaluable resources concerning the rationales
behind the support for immigration among Americans.
Racial Effect
This research seeks to establish what demographic factors affect one’s opinions on
immigrants and immigration policies. Previous literature recognizes that one’s race has a
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significant effect on how the person views immigration (Berg 2014; Bloom et al. 2015; Fussell
2014; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Focusing on the experience of White people in this country,
Berg (2014) shows that White Americans who are exposed to mixed-race or mixed-ethnicity
individuals are more likely to hold immigrant-friendly positions than Whites who live in
homogeneous communities. The researcher explains this phenomenon by applying the contact
theory. Contact theory maintains that the lack of exposure between groups of people can lead to
stereotyping and bias against certain out-group individuals. In this case, White Americans who
live in multi-racial neighborhoods are better able to understand the struggles of immigrants and
people of color because they are forced to interact with those who are not White Americans in
the neighborhood. Thus, it is more likely for those White people to hold sympathetic views on
immigrants and immigration policy.
Looking at the experience of people of color, Browne, Reingold, and Kronberg (2018)
further hypothesize that African Americans are more open to immigration reforms than White
Americans. Their research concludes that while the majority of African American legislators
voted for restrictive immigration legislation between 2005 and 2012, it was at a consistently
lower rate than their counterparts. The researchers controlled political party as a variable and
found out that while Black Democrats were similar to White Democrats on many political issues,
on race relations and civil rights, African American politicians are consistently more liberal. As
immigration issues are an extension of race relations, the study shows that one’s race may affect
how one sees immigrants nowadays.
Furthermore, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) synthesize previous research and theorize that
the perception of competition can be driven by one’s racial identification and racial alienation.
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By conducting interviews, Bobo and Hutchings extend Blumer’s group threat framework and
imply that there is an underlying correlation between race and immigration attitudes.
Religious Effect
In addition to race, various studies also suggest that a person’s religion may influence his
or her attitudes towards immigration. Many scholars hypothesize that higher religiosity may
mean low immigration tolerance (Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Knoll 2009). Through a crosscountry analysis, Bohman and Hjerm (2014) look into the implications of religious belief and
practices. The authors theorize that religious in-group attachment stimulates greater aversion to
people who do not practice the same religion. Although immigrants come from various religious
backgrounds, the difference in national origins often results in differences in denominations and
religions. Drawing on group threat theory and social identity theory, sociologists point out that
religious fundamentalists, who practice more often than non-fundamentalists, may be particularly
against mass immigration, since they have the strongest attachment to each other, resulting in
considerable aversion to those of other religious identities (Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Knoll
2009).
Moreover, Nagel and Ehrkamp’s (2017) analysis of the relationship between Christian
faith and multiculturalism reaches a similar conclusion about religiosity’s effect on immigration
attitudes. The two scholars visited a few dozen church sites in North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia, and interviewed pastors and church-goers. They find that while some congregations
of the Christian faith have very welcoming attitudes toward immigrants, the result is racially and
culturally based. In other words, congregations with high immigrant church-goers are likely to be
the ones with liberal views on immigration. However, there is also clear segregation between
immigrant/non-White majority churches and White/non-immigrant majority churches. Within
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the Christian faith, and among those who regularly practice, there is still a lack of understanding
and tolerance towards people outside the religion. Consistent with contact theory, Nagel and
Ehrkamp’s findings show that homogeneity in religion also leads to racialized bias against
immigrants, particularly immigrants of color.
Political Effect
Furthermore, sociological studies imply that politics and political leanings affect the
attitude toward immigrants (Bohman and Hjerm 2016; Flores 2018; Hawley 2011; Wilkes et al.
2007). Flores’ research on the 2016 U.S. presidential election suggests that Trump’s campaign
speeches mobilized a new wave of anti-immigration sentiments (Flores 2018). By conducting a
survey experiment in which respondents are asked about immigration issues after being exposed
to pro- and anti-immigration messages, Flores (2018) demonstrates that politicians’ messages
have attitudinal effects on their audience.
Comparatively, research by Wilkes et al. (2007) reveals that support for right-wing
parties correlates anti-foreigner sentiments in Europe. Since people of different political leanings
adhere to messages from politicians of their specific political affiliation, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that political leaning correlates immigration attitudes. By examining the relationship
between the existence of radical political parties and anti-immigration attitudes, Bohman and
Hjerm (2016) further confirm the result from previous literature that political leaning is a crucial
part of people’s positions on immigration. Their finding demonstrates that the presence and
representational strength of radical right parties in national parliaments in Europe moderately
correlate anti-immigration views with statistic significance (Bohman and Hjerm 2016). This
correlation is also explainable by group threat theory and contact theory. The platform of many
conservative parties is based on the fear and lack of understanding of a certain out-group.

10

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
Research studies on the effects of political affiliations in regard to immigration attitudes offer
crucial rationalization of the hypothesis that liberal-leaning individuals hold relatively more
positive views on immigration than conservative-leaning people (Bohman and Hjerm 2016;
Hawley 2011; Wilkes et al. 2007).
Educational Effect
Just as importantly, social scientists also point out the influence of educational attainment
as a factor on the attitudes towards immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Lancee and Sarrasin
2015). In theory, Lancee and Sarrasin (2015:490) illustrate that Western educational system
promotes the egalitarian values and the liberalization of the mind. Under this educational system,
students learn to think critically and analyze issues through logical reasoning. On the issue of
immigration, specifically, studies indicate that people with higher education tend to evaluate
economic prospect when formulating their support or opposition to specific immigration policies
(Chandler and Tsai 2001; Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). Furthermore, Lancee and Sarrasin’s
multivariate analysis confirms that higher level of education correlates more positive attitudes
toward immigrants, though the effect might not have been as large as what preceding studies
suggested (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015:497; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2004). Studies on the effect
of educational attainment on people’s immigration standpoints support the hypothesis that the
more years of education, the more likely one is to agree that immigrants do not undermine
American culture and to say that immigrant number to the United States should be increased.
Given a lack of a comprehensive analysis of demographic effects on attitudes toward
immigrants, established literature invites further research into how social identities correlate with
each other in individual’s support for immigration. Additionally, literature provides a theoretical
and rational foundation for the hypotheses in this study.
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METHODS
This research uses data from the 2014 General Social Survey (GSS) (Smith et al. 2018).
The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago carries out the GSS
annually and in recent years biennially. The population of the survey is English or Spanishspeaking, age 18 or older, non-institutionalized or living in group quarters residents of the United
States. The GSS sample is drawn through an area probability system that randomly chooses
respondents in U.S. households, and the response rate for 2014 was about 70 percent. The unit of
analysis in this study is individuals. In the 2014 survey, there are in total 3,842 respondents. For
this study, 1,022 people were included because they were in the appropriate ballots and answered
all the relevant survey questions. The missing data from the survey were removed because they
only represent a minimal portion of the entire dataset. For further information on how the data
were collected, visit http://gss.norc.org/.
This study uses two dependent variables to test the hypotheses. They are “immigrants do
not undermine American culture” and “increase immigration.” The concept these variables are
measuring is the attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. In the General Social
Survey, the first question is “how much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
American culture is generally undermined by immigrants.” Respondents are asked to give
answers as 1 “agree strongly,” 2 “agree,” 3 “neither agree nor disagree,” 4 “disagree,” 5
“disagree strongly.” The second variable is measured by the GSS question “do you think the
number of immigrants to America nowadays should be?” Respondents are asked to respond with
1 as “increased a lot,” 2 as “increased a little,” 3 as “remain the same as it is,” 4 as “reduced a
little,” and 5 as “reduced a lot.” I recoded the second variable so that higher numbers represent
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positive attitudes towards immigration. The new values are 1 “decreased a lot,” 2 “decreased a
little,” 3 “remain the same as it is,” 4 “increased a little,” and 5 “increased a lot.”
The independent variables in this study are race, age, education, political views and
religious services. The independent variable “race” measures the respondent’s racial background
with the survey question phrased as “What race do you consider yourself” in the GSS, and it
includes three valid answers: 1 for “White,” 2 for “Black,” and 3 for “Others.” This research
combines the two categories “Black” and “Others” to “People of Color” to compare the
responses on immigration from White and non-White people. The category “White People” is
assigned value 0 in the statistical analysis, and “People of Color” category is given numerical
value 1. The variable “age” measures the respondent’s age. The survey question is “respondent’s
age.” It is a scale variable with responses from 18 to 88, and respondents of 89 years old and
older are collapsed into one category “89.” For this study and the convenience of having an
interval-ratio level variable, the category “89” is interpreted as 89 years old. The variable
“education” is measured by the survey question “What is the highest grade of elementary or high
school the respondent finished? Did the respondent complete one or more years of college?” It is
a scale variable with possible responses from 0 to 20. Political views in this study are measured
by the variable “liberalism.” The survey question is “where would you place yourself on the 1-7
political view scale?” The possible answers are 1 as “extremely liberal,” 2 as “liberal,” 3 as
“slightly liberal,” 4 as “moderate,” 5 as “slightly conservative,” 6 as “conservative,” and 7 as
“extremely conservative.” I reverse-coded this variable to reflect how liberal a respondent is. In
the new variable, 1 represents “extremely conservative”; 2 is “conservative”; 3 is “slightly
conservative”; 4 is “moderate”; 5 is “slightly liberal”; 6 is “liberal”; 7 is “extremely liberal.” Last
but not least, the independent variable “religious services” in this study is determined by the GSS

13

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
variable that measures yearly religious services attendance. The survey question is “how often do
you attend religious services?” This variable has an ordinal-level answers from 0 to 8, the
variable separates religious events attendance to 0 “never,” 1 “less than once a year,” 2 “once a
year,” 3 “ several times a year,” 4 “once a month,” 5 “2-3x a month,” 6 “nearly every week,” 7
“every week,” and 8 “more than once a week.” To calculate the number of times one attends
religious services in a year, I recoded this variable. The new values are: 0 for “never,” 0.5 for
“less than once a year,” 1 for “once a year,” 3 for “ several times a year,” 12 for “once a month,”
30 for “2-3x a month,” 40 for “nearly every week,” 52 for “every week,” and 100 “more than
once a week.”
The control variable in this study is “sex,” and it is measured by the GSS variable sex.
The corresponding survey question asks the respondent’s sex. Sex is a nominal variable, and it is
measured by value 1 for “men” and value 2 for “women.” The variable is recoded into a dummy
variable which has the men category as 0 and women as 1.
FINDINGS
Univariate Findings
Table 1 illustrates the means, medians, and standard deviations of the dependent,
independent, and control variables. The mean for the dependent variable “immigrants do not
undermine American Culture” is roughly in the middle of 3 and 4, and the median of the variable
is 4. It means that the average response to the corresponding survey question “immigrants
undermine American culture” is somewhere between “neither agree nor disagree” and “disagree”
and the middle point of all responses is “disagree.” Figure 1 demonstrates that nearly half of all
respondents have “disagree” as their answer to the question of whether immigrants undermine
American culture. Furthermore, only approximately 19 percent of the respondents have “agree

14

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
strongly” or “agree” as their answers. It indicates that a vast majority of the population of the
survey do not adhere to the negative view on immigrants.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Table 1 also shows that the mean for the second dependent variable “increase
immigration” lies between 2 and 3. It tells us that the average response to the corresponding
survey question is between “reduced a little” and “remain the same as it is.” It indicates that
many Americans do not want the number of immigrants to their country to be increased, which
also reflects a somewhat negative view on immigration policies. Figure 2 shows that the most
common answer to the question on the number of immigrants is “remain the same as it is,” with
around 42 percent of respondents choosing this answer. The result implies that many respondents
want to maintain the current flow of immigrants coming into the United States. However, Figure
2 also shows that more than 43 percent of respondents chose “reduced a lot” and “reduced a
little.” It shows that many respondents are dissatisfied with the number of immigrants coming
into the United States and would like the number to be decreased.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 3 shows that White people constitute around three-quarters of the respondents, and
Black people are roughly 14 percent of the respondents.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
Figure 4 illustrates that the most common age group is between 45 and 59 years old, with
nearly 30 percent of respondents. The average age of the dataset is approximately 49 years old.
There are also more respondents under 44 years old (around 42 percent) than over 60 years old
(around 28 percent).
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[Insert Figure 4 about here]
For the education variable, table 1 shows that the mean is around 14, and the standard
deviation is around 3. It shows that the average American completes some college education or
associate degree. Figure 5 tells us that it is relatively common for respondents to finish high
school education (12 years, approximately a quarter respondents) or bachelor degree (16 years,
around 18 percent of respondents). Moreover, a great majority of the population completes
between 11 and 18 years of education.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Figure 6 demonstrates that the most common political view is “moderate,” with almost
two-fifths of the respondents. It is significantly higher than any other category of this variable.
The mean and median of respondent’s political views are both approximately 4, which represents
the moderate view. There are slightly more respondents who identify as conservative-leaning
(extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative; around 34 percent) than those
who identify as liberal-leaning (extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal; around 27 percent).
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Table 1 states that the mean, median, and standard deviation for the variable religious
services are roughly 22, 3, and 29. The difference between the mean and the median, and the
value of the standard deviation illustrate that respondents of the survey vary a lot among
themselves in terms of the number of religious services they attend in a year. Figure 7 points out
that the most common response for the variable religious service is “never” (0 times a year), and
the second most common response is “every week” (52 times a year). It further confirms that the
distribution of religious service attendance is bimodal and people either go regularly or rarely.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
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Figure 8 shows that around half of the respondents are women.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
Bivariate Findings
Table 2 is the correlation matrix among all the dependent, independent, and control
variables. It demonstrates that the two dependent variables that measure support for immigrants
(immigrants do not undermine American culture) and immigration policies (increase
immigration) are positively correlated. Their correlation Pearson index r is .28, which means that
there is a weak relationship between the dependent variables, and it is statistically significant at p
< .01 level. It means that the more a person agrees that immigrants do not undermine American
culture, the more he or she supports increased immigration. Additionally, statistically significant,
weak, positive correlations (r = .15 and .19) exist between the independent variable “liberalism”
and both the dependent variables. They indicate that the more liberal an individual identifies, the
more he or she is to agree that immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the
number of immigrants should be increased. There is also a weak, statistically significant, and
positive correlation (r = .19) between “education” and “immigrants do not undermine American
culture.” It means that the more years of education one completes, the more the person is to
agree that immigrants do not undermine American culture. However, there is no correlation
between “education” and “increase immigration.” There is a very weak, statistically significant,
positive correlation between “race” and “increase immigration,” with Pearson r = .092. It implies
that people of color are more likely to say that the number of immigrants to the United States
should be increased. However, there is not a correlation between “race” and “immigrants do not
undermine American culture.” There is no correlation between any of the dependent variables
and any other independent variables (age and religious services).
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[Insert Table 2 about here]
For the relationship between dependent variables and the control variable “sex,” there is a
very weak, statistically significant, negative correlation (r = -.09) between “sex” and “increase
immigration.” It means that women are less likely to say that the number of immigrants to the
United States should be increased. There is, however, no correlation between “sex” and
“immigrants do not undermine American culture.”
Among independent variables, “race” has a weak but statistically significant correlation
with all the rest of independent variables, including “age” (r = -.17), “education” (r = -.14),
“liberalism” (r = .10), and “religious services” (r = .08). It reflects that people of color, on
average, tend to be younger, have fewer years of education, are more liberal, and attend more
religious services than White people. Additionally, “age” is weak and negatively correlated “r = .099” to “liberalism,” but positively correlated (r = .16) to “religious services.” It means that
older people, in general, are less liberal and that they attend more religious services in a year
than younger people. The independent variable “liberalism” and “religious services” are also
correlated with statistic significance at p < .01 level. Their correlation index r is -.25, which
means that they have a weak, negative correlation. It says that people who attend more religious
services tend to be less liberal. There is not any correlation among the rest of independent
variables.
The control variable “sex” is not correlated with any independent variable except for
“religious services.” Between “sex” and “religious services,” there is a very weak, statistically
significant, positive correlation, with Pearson r = .14. It means that women, on average, attend
more religious services yearly than men.
Multivariate Findings
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Table 3 is a ordinary least square regression of attitudes about immigration on all
variables, including race, age, education, political views, religiosity, and gender.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The R2 for dependent variable “immigrants do not undermine American culture” is .063.
It means that 6.3 percent of the variation in “immigrants do not undermine American culture”
can be explained by the independent variables together. The F value of this regression equation
is around 11, and it shows statistical significance at the .01 level. Among the predictors, only
education and political views are statistically significant for “immigrants do not undermine
American culture.” Controlling for all other variables, education (β = .175) has the greatest effect
on the dependent variable, meaning on average, the more years of education one completes, the
more the person agrees that immigrants do not undermine American culture. All else being
equal, political views (β = .139) have the second greatest effect on “immigrants do not
undermine American culture.” It indicates that in general, the more liberal a person is, the more
the person would say that immigrants do not undermine American culture.
The R2 for “increase immigration” is .057, demonstrating that independent variables
combined explains 5.7 percent of the variation in “increase immigration.” The F value of this
regression equation is around 10, and it is statistically significant at the .01 level. Among the
predictors, political views and gender are statistically significant for “increase immigration.”
Controlling for all other factors, political views (β = .182) have the greatest effect on the
dependent variable, showing that the on average, the more liberal a person is, the more the
person would say that immigration should be increased in the United States. Controlling for all
other variables, gender (β = -090) has the second greatest effect on “increase immigration,” and
this standardized coefficient is the only one with a statistically significant negative value. It
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means that women more so than men reject the notion that immigration to this country should be
increased.
Comparing across the table and controlling for all other variables, education is a
statistically significant predictor for “immigrants do not undermine American culture.” However,
it does not affect whether one supports increased immigration. Gender, on the other hand, is not
a statistically significant factor for the variation in “immigrants do not undermine American
culture,” but it is statistically significant for “increase immigration” with all else being equal.
Political view is significant for both “immigrants do not undermine American culture” and
“increase immigration.”
In relation to the bivariate result, in which race has a statistically significant correlation
with “increase immigration.” However, the effect is no longer shown in the regression when
controlling all other variables. It indicates that there is a spurious relationship in the equation for
“increase immigration.”
The multivariate result supports the fourth hypothesis that the more liberal a person is,
the more likely he or she agrees that immigrants do not undermine American culture and says
that the number of immigrants nowadays should be increased. The regression equation also
confirms the first half of the third hypothesis that the more years of education a person receives,
the more likely the person is to agree that immigrants do not undermine American culture. The
regression analysis finds no effect between the dependent variables and other predictors
excluding gender, thus rejecting all other hypotheses in this study.
DISCUSSION
This study seeks to answer what demographic aspects are related to one’s perception of
immigrants and immigration. Controlling for all other variables, education is the strongest and a
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statistically significant predictor for the variable “immigrants do not undermine American
culture.” Education can expose people to diverse groups of people and intercultural dialogue, and
fewer years of education may imply a lack of adequate socialization for a diverse society. This
finding implies that contact theory is applicable to explain the effect of education on attitudes
toward immigrants, since contact theory explains that prejudices and stereotypes come from the
absence of intergroup contact. Such result is also consistent with past literature on the influence
of educational attainment on the attitudes toward immigrants (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015).
Lancee and Sarrasin’s (2015) longitudinal study in Switzerland suggests that education can
positively change people’s attitudes toward immigrants. Comparatively, this study supports that
education may in fact have some impact on how people view immigrants in the United States.
While education has the strongest effect among all independent variable on “immigrants
do not undermine American culture,” it does not affect an individual’s support for increased
immigration. This finding rejects the second part of the third hypothesis that the more years of
education one completes, the more likely the person is to say that the immigrant number to this
country should be increased. This result is also inconsistent with Chandler and Tsai’s (2001)
research. Chandler and Tsai analyzed the 1994 General Social Survey and found that higher
education level indicates more support for open legal immigration policies. However, from the
2014 GSS, it is not true that education has such an effect. The inconsistency may come from the
two decades of time difference of the dataset. During the twenty years between 1994 and 2014,
the United States saw a surge in undocumented immigrants from predominantly Latin American
and Asian countries (Hoefer et al. 2012). At the same time, modern international terrorism and
corresponding xenophobia were also on the rise. Given the complexity and uncertainty of the
world, Americans might switch to more conservative immigration policies with stricter and
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lengthier vetting process for non-citizens to enter the country. Consequently, Americans would
potentially desire a non-increasing flow of immigrants. The change in time might have shrunk
the effect of education on the acceptance of more open immigration policies, thus possibly
explaining a non-significant relationship between education and “increase immigration.”
On the other hand, the findings in this study suggest that political view has a fairly strong
effect on both dependent variables. In other words, being liberal positively correlates the
agreement to the statement that immigrants do not undermine American culture and the support
for increased immigration. While this research is unable to confirm the outcome of antiimmigration sentiments from Trump’s presidential campaign in Flores’ (2018) analysis, the
multivariate result on political views is firmly consistent with many previous studies (Bohman
and Hjerm 2016; Hawley 2011; Wilkes et al. 2007). Particularly, Bohman and Hjerm’s
evaluation on the correlation between the support for right-wing parties and anti-immigrant
attitudes matches the hypothesis that the more liberal a person is, the more he or she is to agree
that immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants
should be increased. This finding extends the previous research that is primarily conducted in a
European context to the United States on the effect of political leaning on immigration attitudes.
Race, age, and religious services, on the other hand, show no effect on both “immigrants
do not undermine American culture” and “increase immigration” variables. This result rejects the
first, second and fifth hypotheses of this study. It also displays inconsistency with Blumer’s
group threat theory (1958) and many previous literatures (Berg 2014; Bloom et al. 2015; Fussell
2014; Browne et al. 2018; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Nagel and Ehrkamp 2017). An explantion
for the inconsistency is that previous literature focuses on one partcular area of demographic
identity. With extensive analysis and careful subgroup examination, scholars in the past were
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able to discover slight differences among subgroups in race, age, and religiosity (Bloom et al.
2015; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Browne et al. 2018). With more interest in how the
demographic factors intersect with each other in forming the attitudes, this research concentrates
on testing potential predictors rather than a thorough separation of subgroups in each
demographic identity. As a result, the effects of race, age, and religious services may be
somewhat weakened by combining subgroups that produce dissimilar effects into the same
category.
The finding that group threat theory may not hold well in this study indicates that
immigration issue may be different from the original concern of group threat theory- racial
prejudice, since immigration, unlike domestic matters, encompasses great uncertainty and
involves global movements. Therefore, it is not surprising that the support and opposition for
immigration across demographic groups are more unclear and requires much future scrutiny.
Moreover, group threat theory does not necessarily intend to describe the threat formed based on
salient social identities such as race and religiosity. The fact that group threat theory fails to
explain three hypotheses in this study does not mean that it is inapplicable to the issue of
immigration. Since people whose jobs are threatened by the incoming flow of immigrants may
logically have more negative feelings toward immigrant than Americans without similar
concerns, group threat theory can help rationalize in some demographic factors on people’s
attitudes towards immigration.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to examine what demographic factors are connected to
people’s views on immigrants and immigration policies. Assessing data from the 2014 General
Social Survey, the research includes 1,022 respondents who answered all the relevant questions
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in this study. The statistical result shows that education has the strongest effect on whether
people think immigrants undermine American culture, controlling for all variables. Furthermore,
political views are significant predictor of both “immigrants do not undermine American culture”
and “increase immigration,” and it is the strongest predictor of “increase immigration.” All other
independent variables do not affect either dependent variables. The findings support the fourth
hypothesis in the study that the more liberal a person is, the more likely he or she agrees that
immigrants do not undermine American culture and says that the number of immigrants
nowadays should be increased. The result also supports the first half of the third hypothesis that
the more years of education one completes, the more likely the individual is to agree that
immigrants do not undermine American culture. All the rest of hypotheses are rejected by the
statistical findings. The outcome of the statistical analysis suggests that contact theory is
consistent with the issue of immigration. It also demonstrates that previous research conducted in
Europe on the relationship between the strength of right-wing political parties and immigration
attitudes is also applicable to the United States. However, group threat theory and works on the
correlation between race and immigration attitudes do not hold true to the result of this study,
possibly due to the fact that this study does not separate subgroup of demographic predictors in
great detail. Rather, the study concentrates on examining many potential factors on a person’s
attitudes towards immigration.
This study reveals valuable information for a crucial social issue in the United States.
Previous works on immigration primarily focus on one specific area of the demographics and its
effect on immigration. This research, on the other hand, provides a broad examination of many
potential predictors on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. The result suggests
that to increase the acceptance of immigrants among American, an adequate education on the
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matter is foremost. Contact theory also proposes that if a person grows up in a homogeneous
community and does not have the experience of intergroup contact, future contact can help
diminish the possible prejudice and stereotyping of immigrants. Moreover, the findings
demonstrate that it is not true to claim that religious people are less open to immigration and to
say that older people are less accepting on the subject. Furthermore, there is no relationship
between race and immigration attitudes, establishing that no racial group, in a larger sense, can
be said to be more opposed to increased immigration, in contrast to some previous studies. This
research extends the sociological inquiry into the issue of immigration by identifying various
predictors of how an individual views immigration and immigrants. It contributes to the subject
and lays some groundwork for future research on this critical issue.
Limitations
One of the limitations of this study is that the support for immigrants and immigration
policies has a narrow definition. The variable “immigrants do not undermine American culture”
can reflect one’s attitudes toward immigrants. However, it is hard to conclude that the person is
supportive of immigrants based on the answer that the individual agrees or strongly agrees with
one aspect of immigrants. Moreover, the variable “increase immigration” also does not fully
reveal the person’s position on immigration policies, since it only measures one component of
immigration policies. A proper variable to test support for immigration should be a composite
one that includes one’s positions on multiculturalism, anti-discrimination, and access to jobs and
housing, in addition to how the number of immigrants should change.
Furthermore, this study examines race too broadly. The 2014 General Social Survey
provides three categories for race: White, Black, and other race. However, only White people
constitute more than one-fifth of the sample. By creating the people of color category, there is a
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loss of variation that may explain the lack of effect of race on immigration attitudes, which is
inconsistent with past literature with detailed subgroups of ethnicities.
Last but not least, the R2 in this study is only .063 and .057 for the two dependent
variables, respectively. It means that only approximately six percent of the variation in
“immigrants do not undermine American culture” and “increase immigration” can be explained
by all the independent variables combined. The small value of R2 signals that some key factors
influencing people’s stances towards immigration are yet to be identified. For instance,
geography may play a role in the dependent variables. Since people who reside on the coasts
tend to be more likely to have multi-cultural and intergroup relations, contact theory predicts that
one’s residence location could be a predictor for immigration attitudes. Although both regression
equations are statistically significant, there is such limitation that more possible factors should be
examined in this study.
Future Research
Previous research concentrates primarily on the correlation between one demographic
background and immigration attitudes. This study extends previous literature by examining
multiple demographic aspects of a person in relation to his or her stances on immigrants and
immigration policies. It lays foundational work for future research that digs deeper into potential
predictors relevant to immigration. For instance, future research can test the relevance of group
threat theory on non-salient identity classifications. Race itself may not affect immigration
support. However, individuals whose jobs in the agricultural, industrial, and service sector are
taken by immigrants can have a strong opposition to inclusive immigration policies. Studying
non-salient identities can help determine crucial predictors on this issue.

26

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
Additionally, Future research can take a more qualitative approach to study individuals’
attitudes towards immigration. In-depth interview, for example, is a great way to understand
people’s reasoning behind a specific viewpoint. Conducting qualitative studies can, therefore,
guide the researcher to identify themes and rationales in the topic of immigration that affects the
future of the United States and beyond.

27

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

REFERENCES
Allport, Gordon. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.
Ben-Nun Bloom, Pazit, Gizem Arikan and Gallya Lahav. 2015. “The Effect of Perceived
Cultural and Material Threats on Ethnic Preferences in Immigration Attitudes.” Ethnic &
Racial Studies 38(10):1760-1778.
Berg, Justin A. 2014. “Whites’ Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy: Are
Multiracial Individuals a Source of Group Threat or Intergroup Contact?” Sociological
Focus 47(3):194-217.
Berg, Justin A. 2015. “Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy: A
Review of the Theoretical Literature.” Sociology Compass 9(1):23-34.
Bikmen, Nida. 2015. “Still a Nation of Immigrants? Effects of Constructions of National History
on Attitudes Toward Immigrants.” Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy 15(1):282-302.
Blumer, Herbert. 1958. “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position.” Pacific Sociological
Review 1(1):3-7.
Bohman, Andrea and Mikael Hjerm. 2014. “How the Religious Context Affects the Relationship
between Religiosity and Attitudes Towards Immigration.” Ethnic & Racial
Studies 37(6):937-957.
Bohman, Andrea and Mikael Hjerm. 2016. “In the Wake of Radical Right Electoral Success: A
Cross-Country Comparative Study of Anti-Immigration Attitudes over Time.” Journal of
Ethnic & Migration Studies 42(11):1729-1747.

28

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
Bobo, Lawrence and Vincent L. Hutchings. 1996. “Perceptions of Racial Group Competition:
Extending Blumer’s Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context.” American
Sociological Review 61(6):951-972.
Browne, Irene, Beth Reingold and Anne Kronberg. 2018. “Race Relations, Black Elites, and
Immigration Politics: Conflict, Commonalities, and Context.” Social Forces 96(4):16911719.
Cabaniss, Emily R. and Abigail E. Cameron. 2018. “Toward a Social Psychological
Understanding of Migration and Assimilation.” Humanity & Society 42(2):171-192.
Chandler, Charles R. and Yung-mei Tsai. 2001. “Social Factors Influencing Immigration
Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey.” Social Science
Journal 38(2):177-188
Czaika, Mathias. 2015. “Migration and Economic Prospects.” Journal of Ethnic & Migration
Studies 41(1):58-82.
Esses, Victoria M., Paula M. Brochu and Karen R. Dickson. 2012. “Economic Costs, Economic
Benefits, and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration.” Analyses of Social Issues &
Public Policy 12(1):133-137.
Esses, Victoria M., John F. Dovidio and Gordon Hodson. 2002. “Public Attitudes Toward
Immigration in the United States and Canada in Response to the September 11, 2001
‘Attack on America’.” Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy 2(1):69-85.
Flores, Rene D. 2018. “Can Elites Shape Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants: Evidence from
the 2016 US Presidential Election.” Social Forces 96(4):1649-1690.

29

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
Fussell, Elizabeth. 2014. “Warmth of the Welcome: Attitudes Toward Immigrants and
Immigration Policy in the United States.” Annual Review of Sociology 40:479-498.
Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2004. “Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes
Toward Immigration in Europe.” Conference Papers -- American Political Science
Association:1-51.
Hawley, George. 2011. “Political Threat and Immigration: Party Identification, Demographic
Context, and Immigration Policy Preference.” Social Science Quarterly 92(2):404-422.
Hoefer, Michael, Nancy Rytina and Bryan Baker. 2012. “Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011.” Homeland Security:
Office of Immigration Statistics March 2012:1-7. Retrieved on October 20, 2018 from
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf.
Janus, Alexander L. 2010. “The Influence of Social Desirability Pressures on Expressed
Immigration Attitudes.” Social Science Quarterly 91(4):928-946.
Jeong, Hoi O. 2013. “Do National Feelings Influence Public Attitudes Towards
Immigration?” Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 39(9):1461-1477.
Knoll, Benjamin R. 2009. “‘And Who Is My Neighbor?’ Religion and Immigration Policy
Attitudes.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48(2):313-331.
Lancee, Bram and Oriane Sarrasin. 2015. “Educated Preferences or Selection Effects? A
Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Educational Attainment on Attitudes Towards
Immigrants.” European Sociological Review 31(4):490-501.

30

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES
Nagel, Caroline and Patricia Ehrkamp. 2017. “Immigration, Christian Faith Communities, and
the Practice of Multiculturalism in the U.S. South.” Ethnic & Racial Studies 40(1):190-208.
Schachter, Ariela. 2016. “From ‘Different’ to ‘Similar.’” American Sociological
Review 81(5):981-1013.
Smith, Tom W, Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese, and Michael Hout. 2018. General
Social Surveys, 1972-2016, Cumulative Codebook and Data file. National Opinion Research
Center at the University of Chicago.
Wilkes, Rima, Neil Guppy, and Lily Farris. 2007. “Right Wing Parties and Anti-Foreigner
Sentiment in Europe.” American Sociological Review 72(5):831-840.

31

DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES

Immigrants do not undermine American culture
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Figure 1. Bar graph of respondent’s agreement with whether immigrants undermine American
culture
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Increase immigration
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Figure 2. Bar graph of respondent’s position on whether the number of immigrants nowadays
should be reduced or increased
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Figure 3. Bar graph of race of the respondents
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Figure 4. Bar graph of age of the respondents
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Figure 5. Bar graph of years of education of respondents have completed
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Figure 6. Bar graph of political views of the respondents
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Figure 7. Bar graph of how often respondents attend religious service
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Figure 8. Bar graph of sex of the respondents
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Table 1. Means, medians, and standard deviations for variables (N = 1022)
Variables
Mean Median
SD
Immigrants undermine American culture

3.47

4.00

0.974

Increase immigration

2.55

3.00

1.018

People of color

0.24

0.00

0.425

Age

49.17

50.00 17.288

Education

13.94

14.00

2.983

Liberalism

3.87

4.00

1.430

Religious services
Women

22.18
0.52

3.00 29.136
1.00

0.500
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Table 2. Correlations (r) between immigrations attitudes and six variables (listwise deletion, two-tailed test, N
= 1022)

Immigrants do
not undermine
American
culture
Increase
immigration
People of color
Age
Education
Liberalism
Religious
services

Increase
immigration
.275*

People
of color
-.061

Age
.018

Education
.192*

Liberalism
.152*

Religious
services
-.072

Women
-.065

.092*

-.079

.068

.193*

-.026

-.086*

-.167*

-.143*

.104*

.082*

.044

-.024

-.099*

.164*

.005

.078

-.049

.001

-.253*

-.025
.136*
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Table 3. Multiple regression of attitudes about immigration on all variables (N = 1022)
Variable
Immigrants do not undermine American
Increase immigration
culture
β

β

People of color

-.041

.074

Age

.033

-.053

Education

.175*

.065

Liberalism

.139*

.182*

Religious services

-.022

.038

Women

-.057

-.090*

R2

.063

.057

11.411*

10.301*

F(6,1015)
*p < .01
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